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ABSTRACT
In some cases, singers have been able to vindicate property rights in their identities
when advertisers have featured sound-alike singers in commercials. However, there
is no case law to support that an instrumental musician can protect herself from an
advertiser imitating the characteristic sound of her playing. This Comment will
explore whether and how the law should protect “musical identities,” particularly
when the plaintiff is an instrumental musician rather than a singer.
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I. INTRODUCTION

S

uppose a major music store, Guitarz,1 advertises its Independence
Day sale on television. The commercial shows a woman walking
into a Guitarz store, picking a guitar off the rack, plugging it into an
amplifier, and playing the “Star Spangled Banner” with sounds that are
deliberately imitative of Jimi Hendrix’s famous Woodstock
performance.2 She skillfully captures the distinctive tone of Hendrix’s
delivery of the first few bars of the Anthem and then begins to imitate
Hendrix’s dive-bomber sounds with stunning accuracy. The
commercial gives viewers a front-row seat, showing the unknown
guitarist actually creating these sounds with her fingers on the guitar.
By featuring a guitarist imitating Hendrix’s sound in its
commercial, has Guitarz misappropriated Jimi Hendrix’s identity?
Midler v. Ford Motor Co.3 offers some support for such a theory.4 In
Midler, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff Bette Midler made a
showing, sufficient to defeat summary judgment, that the defendants
had appropriated part of Midler’s identity by using another singer to
imitate Midler’s voice for the soundtrack to a television commercial.5
The court qualified its holding, stating,
“We need not and do not go so far as to hold that every imitation
of a voice to advertise merchandise is actionable. We hold only that

1
2

3
4

5

Guitarz is a fictional store.
See JIMI HENDRIX, Star Spangled Banner, on WOODSTOCK: MUSIC FROM THE
ORIGINAL SOUNDTRACK AND MORE (Cotillion/Atlantic Records 1970). Jimi
Hendrix’s instrumental rendition of the “Star Spangled Banner” at Woodstock
was particularly notable at the time because of its controversial use of unusual
sounds.
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
Not all states recognize postmortem rights in a person’s identity. See, e.g.,
Experience Hendrix LLC v. James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x 739,
740 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding for limited purpose of appeal that “no posthumous
right of publicity existed in New York at the time of Jimi Hendrix’s death”).
Jimi Hendrix is featured in the Guitarz hypothetical purely as an example of a
musician with a particularly identifiable musical sound.
Midler, 849 F.2d at 463–64. Midler had turned down the defendants’ offer to
sing for the commercial. Id. at 461. The song used in the commercial was “Do
You Want to Dance?” written by Robert Freeman, which Bette Midler had sung
on her 1973 album, “The Divine Miss M.” Id. The defendants had a license from
the copyright holder to use the song. Id.
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when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and
deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have
appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in
California.”6
This Comment argues that an instrumental musician’s personally
identifiable sound, like a singer’s unique voice, deserves protection
from imitation by advertisers.
But is Jimi Hendrix’s distinctive guitar sound, for example,
comparable to a singer’s voice? In Midler, the court relied heavily
upon the relationship between identity and the human voice, stating,
“A voice is as distinctive and personal as a face. The human voice is
one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested. . . . The singer
manifests herself in the song. To impersonate her voice is to pirate her
identity.”7 Based on the court’s reasoning, an instrumental musician’s
“sound” could be something entirely different from a singer’s voice. A
singing voice is closely related to an individual’s speaking voice
because the sound emanates from the person’s unique vocal
equipment, but sounds emanating from a musical instrument are
related to the musician’s identity in a more abstract way because the
musical instrument is not part of the musician’s body. Furthermore,
almost all people are experienced at identifying other people by voice
in everyday social interactions.8 However, identifying a musical soloist
by sound is confined to the realm of musical appreciation, which, even
for music enthusiasts, is a more limited aspect of daily life. Granted,
many people can easily identify a musical group or a singer upon
hearing a familiar recording. Yet, it is far more difficult to identify
accurately a single instrumentalist on an unfamiliar recording, simply
by the sound of her playing, without additional cues, such as a
signature song or known associations with accompanying band
members.
Despite the inherent difficulty in identifying a musician by the
sound of her playing, a musician with a particularly identifiable sound
should have a right to protect her “musical identity” from imitation by
advertisers. For example, innovative musicians, such as Jimi Hendrix,

6
7
8

Id. at 463.
Id.
See id. (“We are all aware that a friend is at once known by a few words on the
phone.”).
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Eddie Van Halen, and John Popper,9 have devoted tremendous time
and energy into developing unique musical personalities.10 It is unfair
for advertisers to exploit their creative efforts.11
Part II of this Comment evaluates the pros and cons of protecting
musical identities and discusses the background of voice imitation
cases. Part III examines the causes of action that could protect against
imitation of musical identities and discusses the limits of protection.
Finally, Part IV concludes that public policy supports protection of
musical identities and that, in most cases, the plaintiff should assert
claims for false endorsement, misappropriation, and the right of
publicity.
II. BACKGROUND
Why should musical identities be protected from imitation by
advertisers? Additionally, if musical identities should be protected,
how can the law achieve this? This Part explores the policy reasons
and the legal foundations for recognizing this type of protection.
A. Protecting Musical Identities
If a musician can create a personally identifiable sound, that
musician should have some degree of control over her creation.
However, in many cases it might be very difficult to recognize a sound
as belonging solely to one musician. This section considers these
competing problems and weighs the pros and cons of protecting
musical identities.
1. Arguments in Favor of Protecting Musical Identities
A musician develops a distinctive sound through talent, creativity,
and innovation. The law should reward creativity and innovation in the
arts in order to promote the growth of artistic expression.12 One way to
reward creativity and innovation is to allow an artistic creator to

9

10

11

12

Eddie Van Halen is the influential guitarist for the rock band Van Halen. John
Popper is the harmonica player and lead singer for the rock band Blues Traveler.
See Edward T. Saadi, Sound Recordings Need Sound Protection, 5 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 333, 346 (1996).
See Seth E. Bloom, Preventing the Misappropriation of Identity: Beyond the
“Right of Publicity,” 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 489, 523–24 (1991).
See Saadi, supra note 10, at 335.
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control the use of her creations.13 When an artist has control of her
work, she has a better chance to make a living in the arts.14 The law
should reward a musician who creates a unique musical identity—i.e.,
characteristic “sound”—by allowing her to control the use of that
creation.
The law should not permit advertisers to profit unfairly from the
innovative efforts of musicians.15 An advertiser imitates a musician’s
sound because that sound in some way enhances the effectiveness of a
particular advertisement.16 The advertiser benefits by using something
that it took no part in creating.17 A musician who creates something
original should be the one to control how it is used.18 Moreover, if the
musician decides that the artistic value of the sound exceeds the
present commercial value, the musician should be able to protect her
sound from commercial exploitation.19
2. Arguments Against Protecting Musical Identities
Although protecting creative rights is a good thing, it must be
recognized that musical creations are never one hundred percent
original.20 A musician creates her sound out of countless musical
influences.21 Granting exclusive rights to a particular style of playing
may give a musician more control than she has earned.22 For example,
a famous musician who models her sound after the playing of a lesserknown musician perhaps does not deserve the right to claim ownership
of a particular sound.23 If the same famous musician were to sue an

13
14
15
16
17
18

19

20

21

22
23

See id.
See id.
See Bloom, supra note 11, at 523–24.
See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
See Bloom, supra note 11, at 524.
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:50 (2d
ed. 2007).
Cf. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462–63. As the court stated, “Midler did not do
television commercials.” Id. at 462.
See Jill A. Phillips, Note, Performance Rights: Protecting a Performer’s Style,
37 WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1694 (1991).
See Russell A. Stamets, Ain’t Nothin’ Like the Real Thing, Baby: The Right of
Publicity and the Singing Voice, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 347, 371 (1993).
See id.
See id.
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advertiser successfully for imitation of the musician’s sound, the
famous musician would receive a windfall, whereas the lesser-known
influence would receive nothing.
Additionally, recognizing “musical identities” is problematic
because they are difficult to identify with any significant degree of
accuracy.24 If a musician imitates the sound of another musician,
listeners are likely to disagree as to whose sound is being imitated
because musical identities are necessarily fluid, changeable, and
imprecise.25 Thus, some would argue that musical identities are
unworkable from a legal standpoint because the law needs certainty;26
otherwise, one cannot know what conduct is prohibited.
Further, some would argue that a prohibition against musical
imitation would punish creativity in advertising.27 Advertising
certainly is an important form of communication. Thus, the law should
give advertisers freedom to experiment with ideas in order to compete
in the marketplace.28 If one subscribes to the notion that “unfixed”
musical sounds29 defy the concept of ownership, then it would be
unfair to deny advertisers the right to make use of such sounds.30 It is
possible, for example, for an advertiser to use a sound more creatively
than the musician who inspired the advertisement.31 If the advertiser
can show that it has used certain sounds in a truly artistic way, the
First Amendment offers a valid defense and an appropriate
safeguard.32

24
25

26
27
28
29

30
31
32

See id. at 372.
Cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:75 (“The crucial factual issue is whether
the [playing] style is so distinctive that more than just a few aficionados could
identify that sound as always linked with the plaintiff.”).
See Stamets, supra note 21, at 372.
See Bloom, supra note 11, at 526.
See id. at 527.
Cf. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A voice is not
copyrightable. The sounds are not ‘fixed.’”).
See Stamets, supra note 21, at 372.
See Bloom, supra note 11, at 526.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at §§ 8:72, 8:121.
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3. The Benefits of Protecting Musical Identities Outweigh the
Costs
Despite the fact that musical sounds are often difficult to identify,
the law should not permit advertisers to exploit musicians who succeed
in creating sounds that are personally identifiable. Granted, musicians
will always borrow from other musicians; this practice promotes the
growth of musical expression. Musician 2 borrows from Musician 1;
in turn, Musician 3 borrows from Musicians 2 and 1.33 The chain of
inspiration is endless. However, advertisers do not contribute greatly
to this process.34 When an advertiser borrows sounds from a musician,
other musicians are far less likely to be inspired to expand upon the
advertiser’s statement because the advertiser’s message is typically a
commercial statement—”buy this product”—as opposed to an artistic
statement. Thus, the advertiser does not hold a comparable place in the
chain of shared musical expression. The creative musician inevitably
replenishes the musical garden,35 but only occasionally does the
advertiser return what it borrowed from the musician.36
Granted, a creative musician might incorporate sounds from a
commercial into a new artistic work. However, preventing advertisers
from exploiting the identities of musical performers does not endanger
the overall landscape of musical expression; it only forces a slightly
higher standard of originality on advertisers, thus appropriately
limiting exploitation without interfering with the ability of musical
artists to imitate sounds and influence one another in the name of
artistic expression.
It is reasonable to incentivize musical creation at the expense of
advertising. Artistic expression is inherently more valuable to society
than commercial speech.37 Musicians use sounds to communicate
ideas that are capable of profound meaning, whereas merchants
primarily use advertisements to propose a commercial transaction.38 A

33
34
35
36
37

38

See Phillips, supra note 20, at 1694.
See Bloom, supra note 11, at 524.
Cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 5:50.
See Bloom, supra note 11, at 524.
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (recognizing that
commercial speech occupies a “subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values”).
See id.
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merchant does not lose its voice in the marketplace if prohibited from
imitating musicians.39 However, a musician’s reputational value, like a
singer’s, may be damaged by having her sound used in an
advertisement.40 The law should protect musicians from commercial
exploitation.
B. Voice Imitation Case Law
Because there is no case law for protection of instrumental musical
identities, an instrumental musician suing an advertiser would have to
rely on the cases involving “sound-alike” singers for support.41
1. Bert Lahr
One of the earliest voice imitation cases was the 1962 case of Lahr
v. Adell Chemical Co.42 Bert Lahr was a professional entertainer, well
known for his comedic voice.43 The First Circuit Court stated,
“According to the complaint the plaintiff . . . has achieved stardom—
with commensurate financial success—on the legitimate stage, in
motion pictures, on radio, television and other entertainment media
throughout the United States, Canada and elsewhere.”44 The court
seemed to acknowledge that Lahr had achieved substantial success in
the entertainment field “because his ‘style of vocal comic delivery
which, by reason of its distinctive and original combination of pitch,
inflection, accent and comic sounds,’ has caused him to become

39

40

41

42

43
44

The merchant’s competitors are similarly limited. Cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that public policy is
“well served” by allowing competitors to enforce false advertising claims).
Additionally, freedom of speech ensures that an advertiser has a valid defense if
it can show artistic value. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
Cf. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103–06 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming
damages award for injury to plaintiff’s peace, happiness, and feelings and for
injury to his goodwill, professional standing, and future publicity value).
See generally Waits, 978 F.2d 1093; Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460
(9th Cir. 1988); Prima v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D.N.J.
2000).
Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); see MCCARTHY, supra
note 18, at § 4:77.
Lahr, 300 F.2d at 257.
Id.
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‘widely known and readily recognized as a unique and extraordinary
comic character.’”45
Lahr alleged that the defendants hired an actor to imitate Lahr’s
voice in a television commercial for Lestoil household cleaner.46 The
commercial featured a cartoon duck with a comedic voice.47 Lahr
brought three causes of action—unfair competition, invasion of
privacy, and defamation—alleging that “the ‘vast public television
audience and the entertainment industry’ throughout the United States,
Canada and elsewhere believed that the words spoken and the comic
sounds made by the cartoon duck were supplied and made by the
plaintiff.”48 Lahr’s complaint alleged further “that this was
misappropriation of the plaintiff’s ‘creative talent, voice, vocal sounds
and vocal comic delivery’ and a ‘trading upon his fame and
renown.’”49 In addition, Lahr claimed that the defendants’ commercial
injured his “reputation in the entertainment field, both because it
cheapened plaintiff to indicate that he was reduced to giving
anonymous television commercials and because the imitation,
although recognizable, was inferior in quality and suggested that his
abilities had deteriorated.”50
The trial court had dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action.51 On appeal, the First Circuit analyzed each of Lahr’s
three claims individually to determine whether the case could continue
on remand.52 First, the court determined that the trial court was correct
to dismiss the invasion of privacy claim.53 The court applied
Massachusetts law and New York law, Lahr having agreed that the
court need not consider the laws of any but those two states regarding
his claims.54 The court determined that Lahr did not have a claim for
invasion of privacy under Massachusetts law because, at that time,

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting the complaint).
Id. at 257–58.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 258.
Id.
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Massachusetts did not recognize invasion of privacy as a tort.55
Additionally, the court determined that Lahr did not have a claim for
invasion of privacy under New York law because the New York “right
of privacy statute” covered commercial uses “of a party’s ‘name,
portrait or picture.’”56 The court was not willing to extend “name,
portrait, or picture” to include “voice.”57
Next, regarding Lahr’s defamation claim, the court took issue with
Lahr’s “assertion that an inferior imitation damaged his reputation,”
stating that it raised a “doubtful question.”58 The court stated,
If every time one can allege, “Your (anonymous) commercial
sounded like me, but not so good,” and contend the public
believed, in spite of the variance, that it was he, and at the same
time believed, because of the variance, that his abilities had
declined, the consequences would be too great to contemplate.
Occasional disparagement of public entertainers is the commonly
accepted lot. Furthermore, there is no absolute test of excellence in
dramatic performance. If what was attributed to the plaintiff was so
manifestly inferior as to constitute actionable defamation, we hold
he must be able to point to some identification with himself more
specific than the remaining similarities. We know of no case which
gives a plaintiff such liberty to put a cap on and at the same time
59
say it does not fit.

Nevertheless, the court ultimately found Lahr’s defamation claim to be
meritorious, stating, “A charge that an entertainer has stooped to
perform below his class may be found to damage his reputation.
Plaintiff’s allegations in this respect are not insufficient.”60
Because the court held that Lahr had stated a cause of action for
defamation, the court vacated the judgment of the trial court and
remanded the case for further proceedings.61 However, the court also
saw fit to “briefly” discuss the merits of Lahr’s unfair competition

55
56
57
58
59
60

61

Id.
Id. (quoting N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2012)).
Id.
Id. at 259.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 258–59 (citation omitted). Lahr alleged that the defendant’s commercial
injured his “reputation in the entertainment field . . . because it cheapened
plaintiff to indicate that he was reduced to giving anonymous television
commercials.” Id. at 258.
Id. at 258–60.
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claim.62 The court conceded that “imitation is not unfair
competition . . . if there is no confusion of source,” but where Lahr
alleged that the defendants’ commercial caused a “mistake in identity,”
the court was receptive to Lahr’s argument that the defendants were
“stealing his thunder” by “copying his material” in such a way that
viewers of the commercial believed they were “listening to him.”63
The court went on to say,
Furthermore, we can hardly agree with defendant that “there is
no competitive interest or purpose served and no real confusion of
product which would lead to the appellant’s loss of opportunity in
the entertainment field.” It could well be found that defendant’s
conduct saturated plaintiff’s audience to the point of curtailing his
market. No performer has an unlimited demand. . . . [W]e might
hesitate to say that an ordinary singer whose voice, deliberately or
otherwise, sounded sufficiently like another to cause confusion
was not free to do so. [However,] Plaintiff here alleges a peculiar
64
style and type of performance, unique in a far broader sense.

Thus, the court found that Lahr had stated a cause of action for unfair
competition.65
2. Nancy Sinatra
Eight years after Lahr, in Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
the Ninth Circuit decided a voice imitation case where the plaintiff
claimed unfair competition. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Lahr and
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants.66 The plaintiff
was singer Nancy Sinatra, who had become popular with her recording
of the song, “These Boots Are Made for Walkin’,” which was written
and copyrighted by singer-songwriter Lee Hazelwood.67 The
defendants, having first acquired a license from the copyright holder,
used a recording of “These Boots Are Made for Walkin’,” sung by an
unidentified female singer, as part of a “wide boots”-themed

62
63
64
65
66

67

Id. at 259.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 713, 715–16 (9th Cir.
1970).
Id. at 712–13.
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advertising campaign for Goodyear tires.68 The defendants’ television
commercials featured “four girls dressed in high boots,” along with
footage of rolling tires, while the song “These Boots” played in the
background.69
Sinatra alleged that she had “so popularized” the song that her
name was “identified with it” and that she was “best known by her
connection with the song.”70 According to Sinatra’s complaint, after an
unsuccessful attempt to employ her for the Goodyear campaign, the
defendants instead “selected a singer whose voice and style was
deliberately intended to imitate” her voice and style.71 Sinatra alleged
that the defendants used the imitative version of the song, while
showing “fleeting views” of girls utilizing Sinatra’s “mannerisms and
dress,” in order to “deceiv[e] the public into believing that [Sinatra]
was a participant in the commercials.”72
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial court that there was “‘no
audio or visual representation, holding out, or inference that any of the
commercials embody the performance or voice of any particular
individual or individuals’” and therefore the defendants “‘did not
mislead the public into thinking their commercials were the product of
plaintiff or anyone else.’”73
Sinatra argued that her claim ought to be decided based on the
reasoning in Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., where the First Circuit found
unfair competition based on confusion over the source of the singing
voice and interference with the plaintiff’s market.74 However, the
Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by Sinatra’s reliance on Lahr.75 The
court stated, “There is no competition between Nancy Sinatra and
Goodyear Tire Company. Appellant is not in the tire business and
Goodyear is not selling phonograph records.”76 Additionally, the court
found Sinatra’s unfair competition claim to be factually different from

68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id.
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id. at 712–13.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 713 (quoting trial court).
Id. at 715–16; see Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962).
See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716.
Id. at 714.
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Lahr’s claim for two reasons.77 First, whereas “Lahr was decided on
the basis of a singular uniqueness of quality of voice,” Sinatra did not
allege that “her sound was uniquely personal.”78
Second, whereas the defendants in Lahr “were not dealing in
materials in which the defendants had a copyright,” the sounds sought
to be protected by Sinatra—”the music, lyrics and arrangement, which
made her the subject of popular identification”—were licensed to the
defendants for use in the tire commercials.79 The court seized upon this
second distinction as further justification for affirming summary
judgment, stating that a state may not enforce its unfair competition
laws when enforcement would “clash” with federal copyright.80 The
court added,
Here, the defendants had paid a very substantial sum to the
copyright proprietor to obtain the license for the use of the song
and all of its arrangements. The plaintiff had not sought or
obtained [the right to control the use of the song]. The resulting
clash with federal law seems inevitable if damages or injunctive
remedies are available under state laws. Moreover, the inherent
difficulty of protecting or policing a “performance” or the creation
of a performer in handling copyrighted material licensed to another
imposes problems of supervision that are almost impossible for a
court of equity.
An added clash with the copyright laws is the potential
restriction . . . upon the potential market of the copyright
proprietor. If a proposed licensee must pay each artist who has
played or sung the composition and who might therefore claim
unfair competition-performer’s protection, the licensee may well
81
be discouraged to the point of complete loss of interest.

Thus, at the time, the Ninth Circuit showed a profound reluctance to
interfere with the domain of federal copyright law.82

77
78
79
80

81
82

See id. at 716.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 717 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-33
(1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964)).
Id. at 717–18 (footnote omitted).
See id.
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3. Bette Midler
Eighteen years after Sinatra, in Midler v. Ford Motor Co., the
Ninth Circuit held that Midler’s claim against the defendant for
imitating her voice was distinguishable from Sinatra’s claim.83 The
court stated,
If Midler were claiming a secondary meaning to “Do You Want To
Dance” or seeking to prevent the defendants from using that song,
she would fail like Sinatra. But that is not this case. Midler does
not seek damages for Ford’s use of “Do You Want To Dance,” and
thus her claim is not preempted by federal copyright law.
Copyright protects “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.” A voice is not copyrightable. The
sounds are not “fixed.” What is put forward as protectible [sic]
84
here is more personal than any work of authorship.

Unlike Sinatra, Midler was able to show that her voice was unique.85
Thus, the court found Midler’s claim to be more like Lahr’s claim.86
However, the court did not find unfair competition, stating, “Oneminute commercials of the sort the defendants put on would not have
saturated Midler’s audience and curtailed her market. Midler did not
do television commercials. The defendants were not in competition
with her.”87
Midler marked a significant turning point.88 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the trial court’s summary judgment ruling, allowing Midler to
pursue her claim against the defendants for impersonating the sound of
her voice in a commercial.89 The court found that imitation for
advertising purposes of a widely known singer’s distinctive voice
interferes with the singer’s “proprietary interest” in her own identity.90
The court’s ruling signaled that a plaintiff suing over the use of a

83
84
85
86

87

88
89
90

Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)).
See id. at 463–64; Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716.
Midler, 849 F.2d at 462 (“Lahr alleged that his style of vocal delivery was
distinctive in pitch, accent, inflection, and sounds.”); see Lahr v. Adell Chem.
Co., 300 F.2d 256, 257, 259 (1st Cir. 1962).
Midler, 849 F.2d at 462–63 (citing Halicki v. United Artists Commc’ns, Inc.,
812 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1987)).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:78.
Midler, 849 F.2d at 463–64.
See id.
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sound-alike singer in an advertisement might find broader protection
than similar plaintiffs had found in the past when those plaintiffs had
relied on such theories as unfair competition, invasion of privacy, and
defamation.91 Starting with Midler, and continuing soon afterwards
with Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., and more recently with Prima v. Darden
Restaurants, Inc., singer-plaintiffs have instead sought protection
under such theories as misappropriation, right of publicity, and false
endorsement.92 However, despite the fact that some courts have
recognized a unique singer’s right to be protected from imitations by
advertisers, it remains to be seen whether instrumental musicians can
find similar protection.93
III. THEORIES AND LIMITATIONS OF RECOVERY
The Midler case was a step in the right direction. This Part
examines what causes of action might be available in a case against an
advertiser for imitation of a musician’s “sound.”
A. False Endorsement—The Lanham Act
False endorsement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act would
be an appropriate way to protect against misuse of a musician’s unique
sound if an advertiser uses a sound-alike musician to deceive
consumers into thinking that the musician endorses the product.94 Not
long after Midler, singer Tom Waits sued Frito-Lay for voice
misappropriation and false endorsement.95 Frito-Lay had advertised
SalsaRio Doritos in a radio commercial, using a song written for the
commercial, which “echoed the rhyming word play” of Tom Waits’s
song “Step Right Up,” sung in the commercial by a singer imitating
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Cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at §§ 4:77, 4:78. In Lahr, the court reversed
dismissal of Lahr’s unfair competition claim. Lahr, 300 F.2d at 260. However,
Midler shows that unfair competition offers limited protection if the singer is an
artist who does not do commercials. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462–63.
See discussion infra Part III. See generally Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d
1093 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler, 849 F.2d at 460; Prima v. Darden Restaurants,
Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D.N.J. 2000).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:75.
Cf. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1106–11 (affirming that imitation of singer’s voice was
actionable under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
Id. at 1097.
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Tom Waits’s distinctive vocal delivery.96 The jury awarded Waits over
two million dollars in damages, which the Ninth Circuit largely
affirmed.97 Waits’s Lanham Act claim was premised on the theory that
people hearing the commercial would think that he endorsed the
defendant’s product.98 Although Waits involved a singing voice,
distinctive instrumental sounds in a commercial might also mislead
people to believe that a particular musician endorsed the advertised
product.
1. Policy Behind Enforcement of False Endorsement Claims
The policy behind enforcement of false endorsement claims is to
prevent unfair competition in order to protect consumers from inferior
products.99 If the law did not protect consumers from misleading
endorsements, a company selling an inferior product could potentially
gain an unfair advantage in the marketplace by tricking consumers into
trusting an endorsement that does not exist.100 The result then would
be an increase in consumers receiving inferior goods. To avoid this
result, the law allows a competitor to sue the false endorser.101 Thus,
enforcement of false endorsement claims under the Lanham Act serves
the policy of protecting consumers by deterring merchants from using
false endorsements.
2. Protection of Musical Identities Under the Lanham Act
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act “‘permits celebrities to vindicate
property rights in their identities against allegedly misleading
commercial use by others.’”102 Does it follow therefore that the
Lanham Act protects musical identities? Waits seems to suggest that
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Id. at 1097–98.
Id. at 1098, 1112. The court vacated a portion of the Lanham Act damages as
duplicative. Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1106.
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 1:23 (4th ed. 2009).
See id.
See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110 (recognizing plaintiff’s standing as a competitor
because plaintiff and defendant “compete with respect to the use of the
celebrity’s name or identity”).
MCCARTHY, supra note 99, at § 28:15 (quoting Parks v. LaFace Records, 329
F.3d 437, 459 (6th Cir. 2003)).
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the answer is yes.103 However, in Waits, Frito-Lay misled consumers
by imitating Waits’s singing voice.104 It remains an open question
whether use of “unfixed” instrumental sounds105 could amount to false
endorsement.
In order to find that a defendant has infringed upon a celebrity’s
identity by way of false endorsement under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, most courts require a likelihood of deception regarding
the celebrity’s association with the defendant’s product.106 For
example, in Waits, the trial court had instructed the jury to consider
“whether ‘ordinary consumers . . . would be confused as to whether
Tom Waits sang on the commercial . . . and whether he sponsors or
endorses SalsaRio Doritos.’”107 The same instruction would be
appropriate where a commercial features an imitation of an
instrumentalist rather than a singer. However, because it is perhaps
more difficult to link instrumental sounds to a particular musician than
to link vocal sounds to a particular singer,108 the instrumentalist might
be hard-pressed to establish a likelihood of deception.
3. Likelihood of Deception
On the issue of whether Frito-Lay’s commercial caused a
likelihood of deception regarding Waits’s endorsement, the trial court
instructed the jury to “consider the totality of the evidence, including
the distinctiveness of Waits’ voice and style, the evidence of actual
confusion as to whether Waits actually sang on the commercial, and
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See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1111 (holding that plaintiff’s “evidence was sufficient to
support the jury’s finding that consumers were likely to be misled by the
commercial into believing that Waits endorsed SalsaRio Doritos”).
Id. at 1106.
Cf. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (describing a
singing voice as not “fixed”). Midler did not include a Lanham Act claim.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 99, at § 28:15. Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham
Act prohibits a false representation which is “likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.” 15
U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110–11 (quoting trial court).
See Stamets, supra note 21, at 372 (“Legal intrusion into the world of pure
sound . . . is simply unworkable.”).

378

UMass Law Review

v. 9 | 360

the defendants’ intent to imitate Waits’ voice.”109 Consideration of
these same factors would be necessary to determine whether use of
instrumental sounds could cause a likelihood of deception. First, the
musician must have a distinctive sound; otherwise, people would not
be deceived.110 Second, evidence of people actually deceived certainly
would tend to show a likelihood of deception.111 Third, evidence of the
defendant’s intent to imitate the musician’s sound would tend to
implicate the defendant in an act of falsity.112
In the Jimi Hendrix hypothetical presented earlier, a false
endorsement claim would differ from the false endorsement claim in
Waits.113 In the hypothetical, Guitarz attempted to disclaim the
element of falsity by clearly showing the woman creating the sounds
on the guitar.114 Thus, despite the close imitation of Hendrix’s
distinctive sound, perhaps viewers would not be deceived into thinking
that the commercial actually featured Hendrix’s guitar playing.
However, the plaintiff could still establish a false endorsement claim
by showing that viewers would likely be deceived into thinking that
the defendant had obtained a license to imitate Hendrix’s sound, but
this could be a difficult argument to prove because viewers may not
think that an advertiser needs a license to imitate instrumental
sounds.115
Overall, a false endorsement claim under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act could be an effective way for a musician to protect
against misuse of her unique instrumental sound. Enforcement of such
claims comports with the policy of deterring unfair competition by
subjecting false endorsers to lawsuits.116 At the same time, because a
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Waits, 978 F.2d at 1111.
See id.
See id.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 3:10.
See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1111 (affirming the jury’s finding that the defendants
actively deceived consumers).
See supra Part I.
Cf. Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd., v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 1148,
1170 (D. Nev. 2010) (discussing the value of surveys, such as one that asked
people whether a “t-shirt maker received permission from someone to put out [a]
t-shirt” featuring Bob Marley’s likeness).
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.

2014 Misappropriation of an Instrumental Musician’s Identity

379

musician must prove a likelihood of deception,117 successful suits
would be limited to situations where an advertiser imitates a musician
with a particularly unique instrumental sound.
B. The Misappropriation Doctrine
In Midler, the court held that Midler could show that the
defendants had misappropriated her identity by imitating her singing
voice in a commercial.118 In Waits, the court affirmed the defendants’
liability under the same theory.119 Perhaps an instrumental musician
could rely on the misappropriation doctrine to protect against misuse
of her musical identity. The biggest question is whether instrumental
sounds can truly evoke the musician’s identity.120
1. Value Protected by the Misappropriation Doctrine
According to Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, the misappropriation
doctrine “is usually invoked by a plaintiff who has what he considers a
valuable commercial ‘thing’ which he sees another has taken or
appropriated at little cost.”121 McCarthy described the
misappropriation doctrine as “a kind of residual legal theory which
may prevail where the taking by defendant is egregiously ‘unfair.’”122
The defendant’s taking is unfair because the plaintiff has made a
“substantial investment of time, effort and money into creating the
thing misappropriated such that the court can characterize that ‘thing’
as a kind of property right.”123
2. Misappropriation—Singing Voices and Beyond
In Midler, the court reasoned that, by imitating Midler’s singing
voice, the defendants had potentially interfered with Midler’s
proprietary interest in her own identity.124 The court established the
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See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988).
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1112 (9th Cir. 1992).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:75 (“The crucial factual issue is whether
the [playing] style is so distinctive that more than just a few aficionados could
identify that sound as always linked with the plaintiff.”).
See id. at § 5:50.
See id.
See id.
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988).
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following elements for voice misappropriation: (1) the singer’s voice
is distinctive; (2) the singer is widely known; and (3) the defendant
deliberately imitated the singer’s voice to sell a product.125 However,
because the court relied so heavily upon the identifiable aspects of the
human voice,126 it is unclear whether the same elements would apply
where a defendant imitates an instrumental musician.
A musician who works hard to create a uniquely innovative
instrumental sound no doubt considers her sound to be a “valuable
commercial ‘thing.’”127 Thus, some might consider it unfair for an
advertiser to imitate the musician’s sound. However, the
misappropriation doctrine would fail to protect the musician-plaintiff if
a court determines that a performer does not have a proprietary interest
in “unfixed” instrumental sounds.128 Potentially, a court could reason
that imitation of a widely known musician’s distinctive instrumental
sound is not actionable because such sounds, unlike the human
voice,129 do not truly represent the musician’s identity.
In the Jimi Hendrix hypothetical, Guitarz deliberately imitated
Hendrix’s distinctive guitar sound.130 Hendrix certainly developed his
sound through creative innovation. Thus, it may be unfair for Guitarz
to use the sound of Jimi Hendrix without permission. The
misappropriation doctrine applies if the “Jimi Hendrix sound” is a
representation of Hendrix’s identity and is therefore “a kind of
property right.”131 In the hypothetical, the woman closely imitated
sounds from a very notable moment in twentieth century popular
culture—Hendrix’s controversial rendition of the national anthem.132
As a result, those sounds evoke an unmistakable image of Jimi
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Id. Although the Midler court did not use the term “voice misappropriation,” the
term appears prominently in Waits. See generally Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978
F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 5:50.
But cf. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1103–06 (holding that defendants, who had imitated
Waits’s voice and compositional style, had misappropriated the singer’s
proprietary interest in the sound of his voice).
Cf. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (relying on the particularly identifiable aspects of
the human voice).
See supra Part I.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 5:50.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Hendrix. In such a case, the law should protect the musician’s right to
control the commercial use of his identity.133 The misappropriation
doctrine would be an appropriate way for a court to protect that right.
C. The Right of Publicity
In Waits, the court referred to voice misappropriation as “a species
of violation of the ‘right of publicity,’ the right of a person whose
identity has commercial value—most often a celebrity—to control the
commercial use of that identity.”134 However, right-of-publicity cases
do not necessarily depend on the misappropriation doctrine.135 For
example, in Prima v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., singer Louis Prima’s
widow sued Darden Restaurants for imitating Prima’s singing voice in
a television commercial.136 The court held that Prima’s widow had
established a prima facie case of violation of her right of publicity in
her late husband’s identity.137 Thus, it seems the right of publicity
could potentially protect an instrumental musician’s personally
identifiable sound without depending on the misappropriation doctrine.
1. Policies Supporting the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is considered a “natural right of property.”138
A person shapes her own identity by the choices she makes in life.
Thus, it is only fair that she be the one to control the commercial use
of her identity.139 Moreover, if she chooses to be a part of public life in
some way, such as through the arts, the law should promote her
contribution to society.140 By protecting a person’s commercial interest
in her identity, the right of publicity provides incentive to those who
contribute to public life.141
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But see supra note 4.
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 5:48 (“The right of publicity can now stand
on its own feet, independent of its early legal origins.”).
Prima v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 341 (D.N.J. 2000).
Id. at 350.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 2:1.
See id.
See id. at § 2:6.
See id.
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2. The Issue of “Identification”
According to Professor McCarthy, the prima facie case for a right
of publicity claim involves the following two elements: (1) validity—
plaintiff owns an enforceable right in a person’s identity; and (2)
infringement—defendant used some aspect of that identity without
permission.142 McCarthy wrote, “To trigger liability for infringement
of the right of publicity, the plaintiff must be ‘identifiable’ from
defendant’s usage. . . . [However, t]he law has yet to define clearly the
line between infringing ‘identification’ on the one hand and
noninfringing ‘reminders’ and ‘hints’ on the other hand.”143
In Midler and in Waits, the Ninth Circuit enforced the right of
publicity through application of the misappropriation doctrine.
However, in Prima, the district court instead simply applied the two
“McCarthy elements” directly.144 With either approach, identification
will likely be the central issue in cases involving infringement via
sounds.145 In Midler, the court alluded to the issue of identification,
referring to the fact that many people who heard the defendants’
commercial thought that Midler’s was the voice on the soundtrack.146
However, in Waits, the court declined to express an opinion on
whether it was essential that listeners believed Waits actually sang on
the commercial.147
In Prima, the plaintiff alleged that the voice on the commercial
sounded like Louis Prima and that the defendant had imitated Prima’s
voice.148 If the Prima case had gone to trial, the court would have had
to consider whether the sounds in the commercial truly evoked the
identity of Louis Prima. If the plaintiff could have shown that Prima’s
voice had distinctive qualities sufficient to distinguish his voice from
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Id. at § 3:2.
Id. at § 3:7.
See Prima v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (D.N.J. 2000)
(citing McCarthy’s treatise).
Cf. Stamets, supra note 21, at 372 (positing that identity through sound is an
unworkable concept).
See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461–62 (9th Cir. 1988).
See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1101 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1992).
See Prima, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
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that of all other singers149 and that defendant’s commercial imitated
those qualities, the plaintiff could have proven a violation of the right
of publicity, assuming she owned that right.150
Similarly, in the Jimi Hendrix hypothetical, whether the plaintiff
asserts misappropriation or the right of publicity, the plaintiff would
have to prove that Hendrix’s persona was identifiable from the
defendant’s usage. Certainly, Hendrix had a distinctive guitar sound.
Arguably, his sound was sufficiently distinctive as to distinguish him
from all other guitar players.151 Yet, very few musicians are likely to
have such a distinctive sound.152 Nevertheless, the law should
recognize musical identities under the right of publicity where the
musician has chosen to contribute to the arts by inventing a sound that
people can recognize as personally identifiable.153
D. Limitations on What Constitutes a Personally Identifiable
Sound
If the law is to recognize musical identities, there must be some
way of differentiating between sounds that are capable of identifying a
particular person and sounds that are too abstract to warrant protection
from unauthorized use.154 This section examines the limits of
protection for musical identities.
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Courts have yet to establish whether identification requires the plaintiff to be
distinguished from all others. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 3:7.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 3:2.
Cf. id. at § 3:7 (“[A]ttributes of plaintiff such as a unique vocal style, a
distinguishing setting, appearance and mannerisms, or a distinctive introduction
by another may all, alone or in combination, serve to identify and distinguish the
plaintiff from all others.”).
See id. at § 4:75 (suggesting that a plaintiff may find that “just a few
aficionados” are able to identify instrumental sounds “as always linked with the
plaintiff”).
See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
See Kathleen Birkel Dangelo, Note, How Much of You Do You Really Own? A
Property Right in Identity, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 499, 522 (1989).
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1. A Performer’s Musical “Style”
In Waits, the court indicated, in dicta, that imitation of Waits’s
“style” would not have been sufficient to infringe upon his identity.155
A musician’s “style” of singing or playing develops in part through
inspiration from countless musical influences; thus, a musician’s style
of singing or playing is not likely to identify her to the exclusion of all
other musicians.156 However, “style” is a broad term, which
inadequately describes what a performer with a particularly unique
“sound” communicates through her instrument.157 For example, an
innovative lead guitarist develops a personally identifiable sound by
having a distinctive tone and great dexterity, by using unique phrasing
and unusual combinations of musical scales, and by integrating diverse
musical influences. The more innovative the musician, the more her
sound is personally identifiable. A personally identifiable “sound” is
something more than mere “style” of playing.
2. Exclusive Rights to Musical Sounds
The Ninth Circuit recognized that Tom Waits effectively owned
the right to exclude advertisers from imitating the sound of his unique
voice.158 However, some other courts have been reluctant to recognize
exclusive rights to musical sounds.159 In Miller v. Universal Pictures
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See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 1992). In closing
arguments at trial, even Waits’s attorney agreed that style was not protected. See
id.
See Phillips, supra note 20, at 1694.
Cf. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 257, 259 (1st Cir. 1962) (holding
that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for unfair competition by alleging
that the defendants imitated the plaintiff’s unique style of vocal comic delivery
in a commercial featuring a cartoon duck with a comedic voice). The Lahr court
used the term “style,” perhaps for lack of a more precise word, to refer to a
collection of very specific attributes of the plaintiff’s voice; the court referred to
Lahr’s style of vocal comic delivery as a “‘distinctive and original combination
of pitch, inflection, accent and comic sounds.’” Id. at 257 (quoting Lahr’s
complaint).
See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100, 1112. The court stated, “Waits’ voice
misappropriation claim is one for invasion of a personal property right: his right
of publicity to control the use of his identity as embodied in his voice.” Id. at
1100 (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1988)).
See, e.g., Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 201 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (1st Dep’t
1960), aff’d, 180 N.E.2d 248, 248 (N.Y. 1961); Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 341
N.E.2d 817, 820 (N.Y. 1975) (citing Miller, 201 N.Y.S. at 634, aff’d, 180
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Co., the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the ruling of the
Appellate Division that the defendant had not interfered with a
property interest by imitating the sound of the Glenn Miller orchestra
on records from the soundtrack to a film.160 The Appellate Division
stated, “Plaintiff never had, and certainly does not now have, any
property interests in the Glenn Miller ‘sound’. Indeed, in the absence
of palming off or confusion, even while Glenn Miller was alive, others
might have meticulously duplicated or imitated his renditions.”161
Similarly, in Shaw v. Time-Life Records, the Court of Appeals of New
York stated that bandleader Artie Shaw did not have a property
interest in the “Artie Shaw ‘sound.’”162
Aside from the statutory issues in Miller and in Shaw,163 a
bandleader’s distinctive sound is fundamentally different from the
musical identity of a lead singer or featured soloist. A bandleader
achieves a unique sound by combining different instruments and
different players. Thus, the listener hears much more than the sound of
the bandleader’s artistry; the listener hears a sound comprised of the
personal talents of each band member. Although the bandleader has
directive control, the individual band musicians nevertheless control
the physical act of producing sounds from their instruments.
By contrast, a lead vocal performance or featured solo stands out
above the accompanying music. The lead singer’s role, as well as the
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N.E.2d at 248); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:75 (stating that the
New York cases, such as Miller and Shaw, are “complicated by the narrow
definitions of the New York privacy statute and the general, but not uniform,
unwillingness of New York state courts to venture beyond the statute.”). The
New York privacy statute prohibits the unauthorized commercial use of a living
person’s name, portrait, or picture. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney
2012). However, the statute contains several exclusions, such as when an artist
has conveyed certain rights to a work. See CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (“[N]othing
contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or
corporation . . . from using the name, portrait, picture or voice of any author,
composer or artist in connection with his literary, musical or artistic productions
which he has sold or disposed of with such name, portrait, picture or voice used
in connection therewith.”).
See Miller, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 634, aff’d, 180 N.E.2d at 248.
Miller, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 634; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:75
(quoting Miller, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 634).
Shaw, 341 N.E.2d at 820 (citing Miller, 201 N.Y.S. at 634, aff’d, 180 N.E.2d at
248).
See supra note 159.

386

UMass Law Review

v. 9 | 360

soloist’s, is to invite the listener to hear a personal message which the
performer communicates directly through her voice or instrument to
the listener. Therefore, a featured soloist, more so than a bandleader,
exhibits her identity through musical performance. The ever-looming
question—in a case against an advertiser that used a “sound-alike”
musician—is whether the plaintiff’s instrumental sound can be
perceived as something uniquely personal to the plaintiff, such that the
law would recognize the plaintiff’s right to claim that sound as her
own.164 Considering the difficulties in identifying an instrumental
soloist by sound, it is likely that very few musicians could be
successful in claiming such a right. Nevertheless, a musician with a
particularly identifiable sound should be able to vindicate her rights
against an advertiser who imitates her sound.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law should recognize that an instrumental musician with a
uniquely identifiable sound has a proprietary interest in that sound as
an aspect of the musician’s identity.165 By imitating the musician’s
sound, an advertiser infringes upon the musician’s right to control the
commercial use of the musician’s identity.166 Where the advertiser’s
use is deceptive, a claim for false endorsement could be appropriate.167
In the Jimi Hendrix hypothetical, the element of deception is
questionable.168 Nevertheless, in light of such cases as Midler, Waits,
and Prima, a plaintiff suing an advertiser that imitated the plaintiff’s
instrumental sound would want to assert a claim for false endorsement,
as well as claims for misappropriation and violation of the right of
publicity.
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See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:75; see also Dangelo, supra note 154, at
522.
Cf. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing misappropriation through imitation of a singer’s voice).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 2:1.
Cf. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106–11 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming
that imitation of a singing voice was actionable under § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act).
See discussion supra Part III.A.3.

